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U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are consistently called upon to work by, with, and 
through indigenous forces to conduct special warfare. Current SF doctrine reflects an 
increasing desire for SF operators to be culturally proficient in order to work closely with 
locals, advise foreign militaries, and build relationships with host-nation counterparts. 
Despite the doctrinal emphasis on cultural proficiency, SF doctrine offers little concrete 
direction as to how to become culturally competent, or how to measure levels of cultural 
proficiency. 
This thesis aims to provide insights into cultural competency by investigating 
academic literature surrounding culture, and by looking outside of SF at examples of 
cross-cultural competency from historic cases: the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 
World War II, Military Transition Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the McDonald’s 
restaurant franchise. By looking at historical examples of military operations and 
international businesses, SF can gain insight into the best practices and common pitfalls 
that come from working with foreign cultures.  
This thesis finds that cultural proficiency can be increased by following the best 
practices of the McDonald’s Corporation and the OSS, and by placing top-down 
emphasis on cultural training and normalizing that training at the tactical level.  
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1 
I. PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND 
U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are consistently called upon to work by, with, and 
through indigenous forces in the conduct of special warfare. In many cases, the success of 
U.S. Army SF lies in their ability to interact closely with locals and foreign militaries, 
and to build relationships with their host-nation counterparts. Despite the working 
knowledge that SF operators may possess of their area’s native language, they may be ill-
prepared to address the cultural nuances they can face while being immersed in a foreign 
culture. Without proper training to operate in foreign cultures, SF operators may be at an 
inherent disadvantage in achieving their missions and objectives. 
Recent SF deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that SF operators may 
not have adequate training in the culture of the areas in which they are operating, and this 
lack of cultural knowledge has affected operations. Since inception, U.S. Army Special 
Forces has served as one of the “go to” Department of Defense elements for subject 
matter experts in dealing with foreign cultures. Lieutenant General Cleveland, the United 
States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Commander, points out that “as a 
force, we (Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF))1 are the cornerstone… 
maintaining alliance, building partner-nation capacity, developing surrogate capabilities 
and conducting multilateral or unilateral special operations with absolute precision.”2  
In spite of years of recent combat experience among the SF community, 
considerable debate exists on the type and amount of cultural training necessary for SF to 
perform its mission of working by, with, and through local forces and populations to 
achieve various objectives. Are SF operators adequately trained to conduct culture-
centric operations? Furthermore, is SF conducting its culture training appropriately? Is 
language training the most effective means of training operators in a foreign culture? 
Some SF operators believe that an unnecessary amount of emphasis is placed on culture 
                                                 
1 While there is considerable overlap between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces 
(SF), this thesis will primarily focus on U.S. Army Special Forces.  
2 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “ARSOF 2022,” Special 
Warfare 26, no. 2 (2013): 3, http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/publications/specialwarfareapril 
2013.pdf. 
2 
and language when operators could be focusing on more measurable skills, such as 
marksmanship, medical training or more advanced-level skills.3 As noted in a 2011 
survey of Special Forces operators, “Cultural training was one of the first things to be 
eliminated when the unit received additional tasks.”4  
The Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
have continued to push for a more culturally adept force. In 2005, the Department of the 
Army published the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and in 2013 USASOC 
published Special Warfare: ARSOF 2022.5 Both of these publications express the 
intentions of the Army and USASOC to create and sustain a force that is an expert in the 
cultures and languages of their respective areas of responsibility. However, both the 
Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and “ARSOF 2022” describe lofty 
objectives without thoroughly addressing some of the hurdles that may present 
themselves if such a high level of emphasis is placed on culture and language. For 
example, how does the SF regiment ensure that its operators are culturally proficient 
without a metric for proficiency? Or, how do commanders balance cultural training with 
other mission specific training requirements? Additionally, how do operators gain true 
cultural proficiency in their area of operations (AO) when so many cultures are present in 
that AO? These publications have considerable differences on what culture is and its 
relevance to U.S. military and SF missions. With a lack of clarity on its definition, how to 
train for it, and how to measure proficiency, instilling cultural proficiency in SF is a 
considerable challenge. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
With these expectations for cultural proficiency in mind, this thesis aims to 
answer the following research questions: 
                                                 
3 This observation has been made by the author during his 16-year military career.  
4 Philip Bushwell, “Keeping Special Forces Special: Regional Proficiency in Special Forces” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 80. 
5 Department of the Army, Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf; United 
States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “ARSOF 2022.” 
3 
Are U.S. Army Special Forces placing the appropriate amount of emphasis on 
cultural training? What specifically should SF operators be trained to know regarding 
culture? Can cultural proficiency be measured?  
This thesis uses qualitative methods in an attempt to gain a clearer perspective of 
the appropriate level of cultural understanding, proficiency, and training that is required 
for Special Forces soldiers. In its qualitative approach, this thesis will investigate three 
trajectories in particular. First, this thesis will examine how both academia and the 
business world view culture and its importance when working closely with foreign 
cultures. SF should have greater cultural training because working “by, with, and 
through” the population is the hallmark of Army Special Forces and requires 
understanding culture. Establishing an encompassing definition is an essential first step in 
understanding culture and training to be culturally proficient.  
Second, current publications and guidelines from the Department of Defense, the 
U.S. Army, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command will be analyzed in order to 
determine what the current emphasis and expectations are on culture in the force and 
what the goals are for Special Forces in regard to culture proficiency.  
Third, case studies are used to examine the effects that cultural understanding and 
proficiency have played in attempting to build relationships, both at the personal and 
group levels. Specifically, this thesis will look beyond SF to learn lessons from other 
military and non-military organizations operating in foreign culture. Case studies include 
the predecessors of modern SF, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in WWII and the 
success that the OSS achieved by recruiting refugees and immigrants who were already 
versed in their native cultures.6 Another case study will look at the varied success of 
MiTT (Military Transition Teams), who were organized similarly to an SF ODA and 
were assigned a mission that is regularly conducted by SF, including their training and 
implementation in the global war on terror (GWOT).7 Lastly, this thesis draws on 
                                                 
6 Richard Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1972). 
7 Sean Pirone, “Security Force Assistance: Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Nation Considerations” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).  
4 
examples from the McDonald’s Corporation and their astounding success of expanding 
their franchise overseas. By examining groups outside of the special operations 
community, SF can gain a fresh perspective on cultural training and how to leverage 
culture to achieve mission success.  
By focusing on qualitative data drawn from a review of military doctrine along 
with studies of culture from the academic and business worlds and case studies from 
outside the SF regiment, this thesis aims to make sound recommendations to assist U.S. 
Army Special Forces leaders in preparing SF operators to be culturally proficient.  
This thesis finds that, first, defining culture is a perennial debate in academia; 
however, rather than focusing on what culture is, SF could hone its training on what 
culture does, specifically the way that culture shapes norms and values, which in turn 
shape behavior. SF faces a challenge, however, in training in culture in general. 
Specifically, when training to become culturally proficient, SF leaders must balance 
training for this skill set with proficiency in other combat skills. However, as 
demonstrated by MiTT training, focusing primarily on combat skills training in lieu of 
cultural training can limit operational success. Also, as reinforced by the hasty selection 
and training of MiTTs, SOF cannot be mass produced.  
Second, as proven by the OSS, selection of personnel can be paramount when 
trying to build a truly culturally proficient force. Specifically, the OSS sought to recruit 
personnel who were native speakers and intimately aware of the culture with which they 
would engage. The OSS recognized that it was much easier to train a culture and 
language expert to be a soldier than it was to train a soldier to be an expert in culture and 
language.  
Third, as validated by McDonald’s expansion into Asia, SF operators need the 
latitude to create their own localized strategy. In other words, SF operators should be able 
to identify what cultural lines of operation will be successful in the areas they are 
operating and address those lines as they see appropriate.  
5 
B. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II examines the concept of culture by 
looking at how academia, the business would, and the U.S. military define culture. The 
focus of this chapter is to gain an understanding of culture by looking closely at the 
differing views and definitions of culture and, as best as possible, to create a working 
definition of what culture is and what it does.  
Chapter III examines current U.S. Army doctrine and training in culture, and what 
the DOD expects from SF based on that doctrine. This chapter also looks at how the SF 
Regiment currently trains its SF operators to be culturally proficient.  
Chapter IV looks at three case studies of both military organizations and 
international business as they interact with foreign cultures. The focus of this chapter is to 
identify the best practices and common pitfalls of working with other cultures, and what 
lessons from these cases can be transferred to SF in their own operations with other 
foreign cultures. 
Chapter V provides recommendations based on the analysis of the cases studies 
and examination of culture in the previous chapters. This chapter seeks to offer 
suggestions that can help SF leaders better prepare their SF operators to be culturally 
proficient and thereby increase their effectiveness overseas. 
6 
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II. DEFINING CULTURE AND ITS ROLE IN ARMY SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS 
How culture is defined and how it is understood varies widely across academic 
disciplines. For example, some academic scholars shy away from culture and refuse to 
define it, while other scholars refer to culture simply as a concept. Sociologist Orlando 
Patterson notes that “there is strong resistance to attempts to explain any aspect of human 
behavior in cultural terms,”8 while anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber and others explain, 
“the concept (culture) has had a name for less than eighty years and that until very 
recently only a handful of scholars were interested in the idea.”9 The business world 
takes a slightly less conceptual view of culture and focuses more on the role of culture in 
economics, negotiations or in transnational business relations. The U.S. military and its 
component commands have varying definitions of culture as well. This lack of consensus 
in defining culture, its purpose, and how to study it presents considerable challenges for 
USASOC and its requirement to make SF culturally proficient.  
This chapter provides a basic overview of definitions of culture from a variety of 
sources. It begins by looking at academic discussions about culture, including from the 
fields of anthropology and sociology, highlighting that there is no one agreed to 
definition. Then, this chapter considers the literature from international business and 
looks at the role that culture plays in economics, negotiations, and transnational business. 
Finally, the chapter outlines various U.S. military sources on culture and their role in 
military operations.  
This chapter asserts that, by examining each of these groups and taking the 
applicable understandings of culture from each, USASOC may be better prepared to train 
its SF operators. By examining how academia has defined culture, what has been 
                                                 
8 Orlando Patterson, “Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and an Afro-American Illustration,” in 
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 202. 
9 Alfred L. Kroeber, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Wayne Untereiner, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts 
and Definitions (New York, NY: Vintage, 1952), 6–7, accessed June 6, 2014, http://www.questia.com/read/ 
100067373/culture-a-critical-review-of-concepts-and-definitions. 
8 
successful for the business world in using cultural understanding to generate profits, 
coupled with what has previously been utilized by the DOD, the U.S. Army, and Army 
SOF, SF may benefit from all of these efforts to understand culture and how it affects 
operations.  
A. ACADEMIC DEFINITIONS OF CULTURE 
The academic world has no universally accepted definition of culture. This is 
most likely due to the fact that culture is a difficult to define facet of human behavior and 
society, and academic disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, and 
social psychology approach culture through different lenses. Each of these fields has its 
own methods of inquiry and understanding of how culture shapes and is shaped by 
human thought and behavior. However, despite this lack of consensus, considering 
academic literature on culture offers SF a greater understanding of not only what culture 
is, but what culture does and how it can be leveraged in SF operations.  
Even the most cursory search on the topic of culture in a single field, such as 
anthropology, yields a wide range of descriptions on what culture is. In Culture: A 
Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, Alfred L. Kroeber, Clyde Kluckhohn, and 
Wayne Untereiner describe culture as, “one of the key notions of contemporary American 
thought. In explanatory importance and in generality of application, it is comparable to 
such categories as gravity in physics, disease in medicine, and evolution in biology.”10 
Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Untereiner add that, “considering that the concept (culture) has 
had a name for less than eighty years and that until very recently only a handful of 
scholars were interested in the idea, it is not surprising that full agreement and precision 
had not yet been attained.”11 Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Untereiner’s comments 
demonstrate only some of the challenges associated with understanding an amorphous 
and multifaceted phenomenon, such as culture.  
Anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn further demonstrate the challenges 
associated with defining culture in their comprehensive study of different definitions. 
                                                 
10 Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Untereiner, Culture: A Critical Review, 3. 
11 Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Untereiner, Culture: A Critical Review, 6–7. 
9 
Their examination produces over one hundred different definitions of culture.12 Some of 
their definitions include:  
 “culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, 
law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
man as a member of society.”  
 “The sum of all [a people’s] activities, customs, and beliefs.”  
 “The beliefs, systems of thought, practical arts, manner of living, customs, 
traditions, and all socially regularized ways of acting are also called 
culture.” 
 “The various industries of a people, as well as art, burial customs, etc., 
which throw light upon their life and thought.” 
 “culture…refers to that part of the total setting [of human existence] which 
includes the material objects of human manufacture, techniques, social 
orientations, points of view, and sanctioned ends that are the immediate 
conditioning factors underlying behavior.”13 
Historical and cultural sociologist Orlando Patterson surmises, “in academic and 
intellectual circles, including an influential group of professional anthropologists and 
nearly all sociologists, there is strong resistance to attempts to explain any aspect of 
human behavior in cultural terms.”14 Patterson’s explanation points to the complexity of 
culture as an academic concept, how difficult it is to define culture, and how culture 
functions. 
Another major line of inquiry in academic studies of culture focuses on what 
culture does rather than what its specific attributes may be. For example, rather than 
attempting to define culture, Kaplan and Manners consider, “how do different cultural 
systems work and how have these cultural systems, in their considerable variety, come to 
be as they are?”15 In this study, Kaplan and Manners choose to refer to culture as, “a 
class of phenomena conceptualized by anthropologists to investigate specific 
                                                 
12 David Kaplan and Robert Manners, Culture Theory (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 
3. 
13 Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Untereiner, Culture: A Critical Review, 81–84. 
14 Patterson, “Taking Culture Seriously,” 202. 
15 Kaplan and Manners, Culture Theory, 3. 
10 
questions.”16 They further understand culture as “phenomena which account for patterns 
of behaving that cannot be fully explained.”17 Kaplan and Manners add that, “culture is 
admittedly an omnibus term, it may be too omnibus to be useful as an analytic tool.”18 
Kaplan and Manners use an example from Marshall Sahlins to describe what culture 
does: “it (culture) is a system of things, social relations, and ideas, a complex mechanism 
by which people exist and persist. It is organized not merely to order relations, but to 
sustain human existence.”19  
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz notes that, “the term ‘culture’ has by now acquired 
a certain aura of ill-repute in social anthropological circles because of the multiplicity of 
its referents and the studied vagueness with which it has all too often been invoked.”20 
Geertz adds, “culture is most effectively treated purely as a symbolic system “in its own 
terms,” by isolating its elements, specifying the internal relationships among those 
elements, and then characterizing the whole system in some general way.”21 In other 
words, Geertz emphasizes not being overly concerned with what culture is, but rather 
understanding culture as a system and how it affects the people associated within that 
system. Geertz proposes, “culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior 
patterns-customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters, but as a set of control mechanisms-
plans, recipes, rules, instructions or programs for the governing of behavior.”22 Geertz 
adds, “man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, 
outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such cultural programs, for ordering his 
behavior.”23  
Similarly, anthropologist Margaret Mead emphasizes culture as a system, as 
opposed to a list of attributes. Mead states, 
                                                 
16 Kaplan and Manners, Culture Theory, 3. 
17 Kaplan and Manners, Culture Theory, 3. 
18 Kaplan and Manners, Culture Theory, 3. 
19 Kaplan and Manners, Culture Theory, 4. 
20 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, NY: Basic, 1973), 89. 
21 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 17. 
22 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 44. 
23 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 44. 
11 
Culture is a process through which man creates his living environment and 
is able to improve it progressively by retaining and modifying advances 
made by previous generations. The word culture is used in the general 
sense to describe the process of man’s species wide culture –building 
behavior.24  
Mead, like Geertz, argues that culture can be learned and passed on to others and that 
much can be learned from studying how culture is learned between people.25  
Social scientist Gert Jan Hofstede describes culture as  
what we call the unwritten rules of how to be a good member of the group; 
it defines the group as a “moral circle.” It inspires symbols, heroes, rituals, 
laws, religions, taboos, and all kinds of practices - but its core is hidden in 
unconscious values that change at a far slower rate than the practices.26  
The study of culture, according to GJ Hofstede, is aimed at better understanding the 
official and unofficial rules that bind groups of people together. Organizational 
anthropologist Geert Hofstede, father and colleague of Gert Jan Hofstede, defines culture 
as “the collective program of the mind,”27 and that, “culture is the glue that holds society 
together.”28 His research demonstrates the depth of the subject of culture and the level of 
importance culture plays in society.  
Similar to Gert Jan Hofstede, Francis Fukuyama describes a useful subset of 
culture known as social capital. “Social capital can be defined simply as a set of informal 
values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with 
one another.”29 Social capital could be compared to rapport, or in other instances social 
capital could equate to trust. Fukuyama describes that after gaining social capital, 
“members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then 
                                                 
24 Margaret Mead, Continuities in Cultural Evolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 
36. 
25 Mead, Continuities in Cultural Evolution, 27. 
26 Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, “Hofstede’s View of Culture,” accessed June 6, 2014, 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/. 
27 “Geert Hofstede on Culture,” YouTube video,” 32:22, October 22, 2011, http://www.geerthof 
stede.nl/. 
28 “Geert Hofstede on Culture.” 
29 Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital,” in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. 
Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 98. 
12 
they will come to trust one another; trust acts like a lubricant that makes any group or 
organization run more efficiently.”30  
Anthropologist Ruth Benedict contends that understanding culture helps in 
making sense of the actions of another group. For example, when calculating what 
actions the Japanese might take in World War II, Benedict argued that a greater 
understanding of Japanese culture would help anticipate Japanese behavior and responses 
to U.S. actions.31 In her seminal work, The Sword and the Chrysanthemum, Benedict 
concludes  
whether the issue was military or diplomatic, every insight was important. 
We had to try to understand Japanese habits of thought and emotion and 
the patterns into which these habits fell. We had to know the sanctions 
behind these actions and opinions. We had to put aside the premises on 
which we act as Americans and to keep ourselves from leaping to the easy 
conclusion that what we would do in an easy situation is what they would 
do.32 
In the post-September 11 security world, Samuel Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations offers another perspective on how culture affects behavior. He argues that 
civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and that “cultures 
can change and the nature of their impacts on politics and economics can vary from one 
period to another. Yet, the major differences in political and economic development 
among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures.”33 Huntington’s 
observations suggest that culture is not a fixed entity, but rather a fluid way of life that 
has profound effects on the people living in the area where that culture exists.  
Despite all of these variances in defining what culture is and does, a few common 
themes do emerge from the multitude of definitions. First, culture can be shared and 
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transferred among groups.34 This observation suggests that outsiders to a culture can 
observe and learn the culture of a particular group. Second, the importance of culture 
within groups and society can be recognized as one of the binding elements of that 
group.35 Observing and understanding key “binding” aspects of a culture can be useful 
for understanding not only how that group operates, but also what its priorities are. Third, 
cultures change. This observation stresses that assessing another culture requires constant 
evaluation as cultures are ever-changing. It also suggests that understanding what makes 
cultures change could be useful for understanding what influences that group. 
Realizing the importance of cultural norms, practices, and certain cultural nuances 
is particularly important for SF. For example, Geertz’ explanation of culture suggests 
that, “extragenetic cultural programs” can be learned or adopted by an outsider and used 
to gain acceptance or familiarity within that group. This observation could be directly 
applicable in the case of SF operators working by, with, and through foreign indigenous 
forces. Similarly, Fukuyama’s definition of social capital could be very useful to SF 
operators as they attempt to build relationships with people from a foreign culture. By 
identifying and catering to the informal values and norms of a group, SF operators may 
be able to build rapport and credibility with that group, thereby gaining social capital. 
Training SF operators to identify values and norms of a culture in order to gain social 
capital could prove more effective than attempting to train an operator to be an expert of 
a variety of cultures. Recognizing how certain cultural considerations can influence 
military and diplomatic decision making in foreign cultures can certainly contribute to the 
effectiveness of SF operators. Finally, by understanding and applying the previously 
stated themes of culture, SF operators may benefit from using one of the academic 
descriptions of culture similar to that provided by Geert Hofstede, “culture is the glue that 
holds society together.”36 
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B. THE BUSINESS WORLD’S DEFINITIONS OF CULTURE 
Another useful body of literature for understanding culture comes from the 
business world. This literature spends less time on attempting to define culture and 
focuses more on how to effectively interact and shape culture to achieve specific business 
goals. For example, business professor and negotiations trainer Stuart Diamond simply 
refers to culture as, “the affiliations from which individuals get their identity.”37 
Economist, sociologist, and politician Daniel Patrick Moynihan notes that, “the central 
conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, which determines the success of a 
society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from 
itself.”38 Finally, economic strategist Michael Porter states that 
attitudes, values, and beliefs that are sometimes collectively referred to as 
“culture” play an unquestioned role in human behavior and progress. 
However, the question is not whether culture has a role but how to 
understand this role in the context of the broader determinants of 
prosperity.39  
This economic-based view of culture suggests that, if understood appropriately, culture 
could be leveraged to achieve a particular end state, thereby creating more prosperity in 
that area. More importantly these descriptions of culture show how powerful culture can 
be in a society, as it not only shapes peoples individual identities, but it can drive politics, 
progress, and prosperity.  
Moreover, when examining culture and its role in world markets, business 
professor Michael Hinner takes a strictly economic approach to explaining culture:  
Culture determines what products and services are considered essential, 
how one negotiates with them, how one uses them, what they signify, 
what they are thought to be worth, etc. That is why it is essential to 
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understand culture, in order to understand the principles of business. 
Essentially, business revolves around culture.40  
Hinner’s comments demonstrate that understanding culture can be the determining factor 
in the success or failure of a business. Likewise, a business’ ability to identify and market 
to specific cultural demands may be key in setting it apart from its competitors.  
Economist and anthropologist Robert Edgerton takes a cautious approach when 
dealing with culture. In quoting fellow economist Roy Ellen, Edgerton points out that, 
“cultural adaptations are seldom the best of all possible solutions and never entirely 
rational.”41 Edgerton further contends 
It is mistaken to maintain, as many scholars do, that if a population has 
held to a traditional belief or practice for many years, then it must play a 
useful role in their lives. Traditional beliefs and practices may be useful, 
may even serve as important adaptive mechanisms, but they may also be 
inefficient, harmful, and even deadly.42  
There may be many reasons not to adapt certain aspects of foreign culture to a 
specific mission. For example, Edgerton notes that culturally based non-rational decisions 
on “what type of crop to plant, or when to raid an enemy may be based on prophecies, 
dreams, and other supernatural phenomena.”43 Edgerton further describes, “one southern 
African kingdom was utterly destroyed when its cherished prophets urged that all its 
cattle be killed and no crops be planted. The result was predicted to be a millennium; 
instead, it was starvation, as a more rational system would have predicted.”44 In addition 
to being very difficult to do, attempting to change a culture could come with difficult to 
determine and dangerous second and third order effects. Finally, changing one’s own 
culture or trying to adapt to the host culture could be construed as disingenuous and could 
result in its own set of unintended consequences.  
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In exploring the success of McDonald’s franchises in East Asia, James Watson 
describes culture as, “not something that people inherit as an undifferentiated bloc of 
knowledge from their ancestors, but is a set of ideas, reactions, and expectations that is 
constantly changing as people and groups themselves change.”45 Watson describes how 
culture is used “to capture the feeling of appropriateness, comfort, and correctness that 
govern the construction of personal preferences, or “tastes,” and thereby make 
McDonald’s successful in East Asia.46 By balancing the different norms and traditions of 
the various regions and countries in East Asia, and a growing appeal for western culture, 
McDonald’s franchises were able to “discern and appeal to customer needs.”47 
Many of these examples have direct applicability to SF operators. First, as with 
the business world, SF soldiers aim to leverage culture to support their various missions. 
A better understanding of the ways by which SF can comprehend and change culture for 
mission success is useful. Planning, tactics, and operations, can all be adjusted to 
leverage and work through the culture for change. Second, changing culture could come 
with unintended consequences. It is important, therefore, to at least attempt to understand 
the wider implications of attempting to change a group’s culture. Third, understanding 
what aspects of a foreign culture should be adopted and what aspects of that culture 
should be influenced to change can have a significant impact on an SF mission or even a 
single line of operation within that mission. Finally, as demonstrated by numerous 
McDonald’s franchises in East Asia, being able to identify and cater to key cultural 
aspects, while simultaneously promoting one’s own values can yield success.  
C. HOW DOES THE U.S. MILITARY DEFINE CULTURE? 
Similar to academia and business literature, the DOD and its subordinate 
components have a wide range of definitions for culture. The Joint Publication 1–02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms sets the standard for 
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terminology for joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States.48 Despite the 
importance of JP 1–02 in coordinating terms across the DOD, the publication simply 
defines culture as, “a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are 
such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and in a broad sense all names 
and legends on a map.”49 This definition refers only to tangible objects created by a 
group, state, or region; it does not address intangible aspects of culture, such as values, 
informal norms, and rules, sources of leadership, and so on. Undoubtedly, this lack of 
clarity from the DOD increases the potential that each service component can define and 
ultimately understand culture differently.  
In addition to JP 1–02, two influential and commonly applicable U.S. Army 
publications are the Culture and Foreign Language Strategy and The U.S. Army’s 
counterinsurgency manual, FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency. The Army Culture and Foreign 
Language Strategy defines culture as, “the set of distinctive features of a society or 
group, including but not limited to values, beliefs, and norms, that ties together members 
of that society or group and that drives action and behavior.”50 Similarly, the U.S. 
Army’s counterinsurgency manual offers more detailed explanations of culture, including 
that culture itself is complementary to social structure. The two are mutually dependent 
and reinforcing; a change in one results in a change in the other.51 The Army 
counterinsurgency manual further clarifies culture by describing it as a “web of meaning” 
shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.52 Specifically, the 
Army counterinsurgency manual states that culture is: 
 A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that 
members of a society use to cope with their world and with one another. 
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 Learned, though a process called enculturation. 
 Shared by members of a society; there is no “culture of one.” 
 Patterned, meaning that people in a society live and think in ways forming 
definite, repeating patterns. 
 Changeable, through social interactions between people and groups. 
 Arbitrary, meaning that Soldier and Marines should make no assumptions 
regarding what a society considers right and wrong, good and bad. 
 Internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and 
perceived as “natural” by people within the society.53 
The U.S. Army COIN manual adds that  
Culture could also be described as an “operational code” that is valid for 
an entire group of people; this observation corresponds to academic 
literature that describes culture as a motivating force. In other words, 
culture conditions the individual’s range of actions and ideas, including 
what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or 
not to do it with. Culture also includes under what circumstance the 
“rules” shift and change. Culture influences how people make judgments 
about what is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, 
categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into existing 
categories. Finally, cultural rules are flexible and proactive; they change 
according to time and circumstances.54  
As an example of the diverging views of culture across the different service 
components, the Marine Corps, with its long history of counterinsurgency operations, 
understands that “culture is neither linear nor predictable and that Marines should not 
expect education in culture to provide easy solutions to military problems.”55 This 
statement makes the important observation that culture is not moving in a linear fashion 
and that being a “cultural expert” may not be possible and even if one were an expert, it 
may not be sufficient when dealing with foreign cultures. 
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D. HOW DO THESE DEFINITIONS INFORM U.S. SF TRAINING IN 
CULTURE? 
While U.S. Special Forces have operated and worked closely with other cultures 
since their inception, the DOD as a whole may have only started to place a significant 
amount of importance on culture in the last decade. U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, along with other areas of operation, have alerted the military of the importance of 
culture at the tactical and operational levels. For example, Jiyul Kim of the U.S. Army 
War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, argues, “the Department of Defense’s “cultural 
turn,” in which emphasis is placed on culture as an important if not a decisive factor in 
countering insurgencies.”56  
Perhaps the most significant change in the U.S. military’s focus on culture is the 
evolution of the Human Domain, the sixth domain of warfighting. A Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) study of the human domain points out that 
the human domain is certainly nothing new. However, it has been largely 
under-analyzed and undervalued as a realm of warfare. Innovations in 
technology, specifically communications and transportation technologies, 
have connected people in new ways. Because of these advances in 
technology, and the various types of globalization they inspire, the human 
domain is now coming to the forefront as an analytically distinct realm of 
warfare.57  
The study goes on to add, “more specifically, the human domain is comprised of 
humans, including humans as physical beings, human thought, emotion, human action, 
human collectives (such as groups), and what humans create.”58 The Human Domain is 
not new to Special Forces; it and other ARSOF forces have been specifically designed to 
work in the Human Domain since the 1950s. In fact, ADRP 3–05 describes Army SOF as, 
“a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and 
foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight 
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alongside indigenous combat formations.”59 USASOC asserts, “training venues must 
reflect an understanding of the influence of various cultures and actors present in 
potential operating environments including the use of cultural and language role players, 
in which to better prepare the trainees for the cultures they will encounter overseas.”60  
USASOC continues to recognize that one of SF’s critical capabilities lie within its 
ability to conduct special warfare. ARSOF 2022 defines special warfare as  
the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-
lethal actions taken by specially trained and educated forces that have a 
deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-
unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to build and fight 
alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or 
hostile environment.61  
USASOC adds that  
special warfare soldiers should possess expertise in tactics, combat-adviser 
skills, military deception, sabotage and subversion, expertise in foreign 
language, relationship-building skills, cultural understanding, adaptive 
decision making and cognitive problem solving.62  
This however, is not an exhaustive list of the skills and attributes that SF soldiers are 
expected to possess. Additionally, many of these skills and attributes may have a robust 
list of sub-tasks, which are required to be mastered prior to being considered proficient in 
the task. Remaining proficient in these skills can prove difficult when considering the 
amount of training time available to SF operators. Additionally, some of the 
aforementioned skills, such as relationship-building skills and cultural understanding may 
not always have a proficiency metric attached to that respective task.  
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E. CONCLUSION  
USASOC underscores the importance of culture for the range of missions SF is 
supposed to perform, but does not clarify what the SOF operator should know and why. 
Building on academic and business literature, as well as military discussions on culture 
and the human domain, this thesis proposes the following approach to understanding 
culture for SF.  
1. The SF Regiment would be best served by defining culture similar to the 
U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual which defines culture as: 
“an “operational code” that is valid for an entire group of people; this 
observation corresponds to academic literature that describes culture as a 
motivating force. In other words, culture conditions the individual’s range 
of actions and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do 
it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with.”63 
2. It is important for SF to discern not only what culture is, but also what it 
does. Specifically, culture shapes values and informal norms that govern 
society. Understanding these values and norms could present opportunities 
for leveraging culture for SF missions.  
3. As noted in Marine Corps literature, being a culture expert, while 
extremely important, is not a panacea for dealing with foreign cultures. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, culture is extremely complicated and at times 
difficult to conceptualize. However, by applying a less complex definition 
of this intricate subject, SF operators will be able to move culture from the 
theoretical realm into the operational realm while effectively applying 
their understanding of culture.  
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III. CURRENT U.S. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE IN CULTURE 
As argued in the previous chapter, the importance of being culturally proficient 
cannot be understated for mission success in the military operations that the United States 
is currently facing. That importance can be amplified significantly throughout the 
conduct of most SF operations. By better understanding and being able to analyze 
culture, SF leadership can move forward with training geared toward the standards set by 
the DOD, the U.S. Army, and the USASOC. 
This chapter investigates the expectations of the DOD, United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and USASOC for cultural requirements for SF 
soldiers. Specifically, it considers the many requirements that a SF Operational 
Detachments-Alpha (ODA) must have against culture and language requirements. 
Rightfully, much is expected from SF regarding their mission readiness and operational 
competence. However, the current doctrine surrounding culture combined with the other 
required training tasks leave SF leadership little open space on their training schedule. 
Lack of training time combined with the lack of established measures of effectiveness to 
grade cultural proficiency makes it increasingly difficult for SF operators to satisfy the 
requirements placed on them by the higher commands. 
Some of the DOD expectations for SF are described in the Defense Language 
Transformation Roadmap. This publication is not directed specifically towards USASOC 
and its subordinate commands. However, it is important to examine where USASOC 
receives its direction regarding culture and how that direction is passed down to the 
tactical levels. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap notes that  
post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of 
Defense needs a significantly improved organic, or in house, capability in 
emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area 
skill in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly 
expand its language capabilities on short notice.64  
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While the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap is focused on language, it 
suggests that language proficiency is important in gaining regional and cultural 
understanding. Language comprehension and language proficiency may play a significant 
role in building credibility with another culture, but foreign language proficiency does 
not directly correlate to cultural understanding. Additional skills are needed to analyze 
foreign cultures with the aim of building rapport. With a lack of clearly defined directives 
from the DOD, USASOC and its subordinate commands are left to determine the correct 
levels of proficiency needed for their tentative mission requirements. In many cases, 
ambiguous guidelines or directives are beneficial as the DOD may not fully understand 
the complexities that exist at the operational and tactical levels. However, without clear 
directives, the possibility remains that the DOD may have unrealistic expectations of the 
capabilities of USASOC and its subordinate SF operators. 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM) directs 
the way ahead for SOF in SOCOM 2022: Forging the Tip of the Spear:  
USSOCOM must not only continue to pursue terrorist wherever we may 
find them, we must rebalance the force and tenaciously embrace indirect 
operations in the “Human Domain,” the totality of the physical, cultural, 
and social environments that influence human behavior in a population-
centric conflict.65  
SOCOM goes on to add, “the human domain is about developing understanding of, and 
nurturing influence among, critical populaces.”66 SOCOM provides little guidance on 
how to train for success in the human domain or how to develop understanding, nurturing 
and influence among the populace. Yet, it is left up to the subordinate commands and the 
operational units to be prepared to fulfill the SOCOM commander’s vision as it is 
described in SOCOM 2020.  
Additional doctrine at the Army level helps shape how operational units train to 
become culturally proficient. FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, provides several points that 
can be used as training objectives. The Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual does not 
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direct what type of training SF operators should conduct, however, the manual does spell 
out ways to be more successful when conducting counterinsurgency operations. 
According to FM 3–24, one of the keys to fighting an insurgency is understanding the 
local populace and gaining intelligence from that population. Intelligence in COIN 
operations is about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the host nation, the 
insurgents, and the host nation government. Commanders and planners require insight 
into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and decision making processes of 
individuals and groups.67  
The COIN manual goes on to add that knowledge of culture can provide a greater 
understanding of the society at large. “A society can be defined as a population whose 
members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a 
common culture, and share a sense of identity.”68 Much like the definitions and 
descriptions of culture provided by the academic world, these descriptions from the 
COIN manual could help SF in defining what culture is and how to prepare SF operators 
to be culturally proficient. The COIN manual further clarifies that, “understanding the 
cultures and society in the area of operations allows counterinsurgents to achieve 
objectives and gain support.”69 Finally, the COIN manual also addresses culture and its 
role in a counterinsurgency operational environment:  
Culture forms the basis of how people interpret, understand, and respond 
to events and people around them. Cultural understanding is critical 
because who a society considers to be legitimate will often be determined 
by culture and norms. Additionally, counterinsurgency operations will 
likely be conducted as part of a multinational effort, and understanding the 
culture of allies and partners is equally critical.70  
Throughout the COIN manual the importance of culture is stressed; however, it 
does not explain how to conduct training that will address cultural proficiency. By using 
the points laid out in the COIN manual, SF can help design their training programs to 
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ensure that SF operators are prepared to address the cultural dynamics they encounter 
throughout their operations.  
Much of the long-term guidance for all Army Special Operations and specifically 
Special Forces is published in ARSOF 2022. USASOC objective, stated in ARSOF 2022, 
declares that 
USASOC will be able to provide joint-force commanders scalable nodes, 
with unmatched levels of tactical skill and language and cultural expertise, 
which establish persistent and distributed networks that provide the nation 
precise and nuanced asymmetric capability.71  
Essentially, USASOC should be able to support fighting the enemies of the United States 
in whatever type of conflict that arises by providing the right number of operators who 
are experts at tactics, culture, and language. ARSOF 2022 goes on to state that, 
“USASOC will field a diverse, regionally expert force with the world’s best trained and 
educated special operations Soldiers capable of addressing uncertainty.”72 Once again, 
this regionally expert force must be able to address the cultural nuances that are present 
in their assigned areas of operations in order to meet the USASOC Commander’s intent 
and to be successful in their assigned missions.  
Despite stating the goal that SF soldiers are to be culturally and linguistically 
proficient, ARSOF 2022 offers little in the way of metrics for training and measuring 
proficiency of SF soldiers in cultural knowledge for mission success. Initial training for 
SF operators is conducted during the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), 
commonly known as the Q course. The Q course is run by John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS or SWCS). In addition to training SF operators, 
SWCS is the proponent for the training of other SOF elements, such as Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP). The stated vision of SWCS includes that “SWCS 
promotes life-long learning and transformation.”73 SWCS’s website claims, “by using 
lessons learned from these battlefields, curriculum and doctrine can be amended in a 
                                                 
71 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “ARSOF 2022,” 9. 
72 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “ARSOF 2022,” 17. 
73 “JFKSWCS,” accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/index.html. 
27 
matter of weeks when gaps in training are identified.”74 By remaining a flexible and ever-
changing organization, SWCS is able to incorporate and react to the latest tactics, 
techniques and procedures from the world’s current conflicts. 
In an attempt to meet the proficiency requirements directed by the USASOC 
Commander, described in ARSOF 2022, SWCS has retooled its cultural instruction for SF 
trainees. Led by the Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne), the Department of 
Regional Studies and Culture developed a course entitled “Foundations of Cross Cultural 
Competence” (FC3), which was initiated in February 2014. The creators of FC3 claim, 
“This course is designed to provide students with a foundational, conceptual, and applied 
skill set that can be built upon to enhance their ability to contend in the human domain 
and continue the development of the 7th Warfighting Function (the Human Domain).”75  
While the importance of cultural proficiency is stressed throughout the different 
phases of the Q course, FC3 is the only course dedicated solely to building the cultural 
proficiency of SF soldiers. The FC3 syllabus states that, “upon satisfactory completion of 
this course, students will recognize the significance of culture and integrate knowledge 
about the human domain into SOF operations.”76 This 10-day, short segment of training 
is not intended to transform SF Operators into culture experts, but rather to heighten their 
overall awareness of culture and its importance in operations.  
The course’s description goes on to argue, “The FC3 course focuses on enhancing 
students’ skill sets in applying cross cultural field skills including principles of 
persuasion, influence, and cross cultural communications.”77 Additionally, “FC3 students 
will learn to view the operational environment through various “lenses,” adding 
versatility to their ability to forecast outcomes, make informed decisions, and maneuver 
                                                 
74 “JFKSWCS.” 
75 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. Email to author, April 30, 2014. 
76 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. 
77 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. 
28 
within the human domain with increased precision.”78 By not focusing on a single culture 
or a group of similar cultures from a specific region, SF trainees are taught how to be 
better decision makers, when culture is involved, instead of trying to create an operator 
that is an expert in a single culture.  
Across the ten-day curriculum, students are exposed to a brief overview of culture 
in America, the importance of understanding culture and its components for the U.S. 
military, and how to apply cross cultural competence during their operational duties.79 In 
an attempt to prepare the SF students better for dealing with foreign cultures, 
the FC3 course asks the students to take and introspective look at their 
own culture and examine their own values, beliefs and behaviors. This 
instruction is intended to lay the ground work of self-awareness that is 
imperative to exceling in the challenging cross cultural settings SF, and 
other SOF soldiers, will face when they are deployed.80  
Throughout the FC3 course, the instruction is introduced to the SF candidates 
through a combination of lecture, reading assignments, student produced essays, and 
practical exercises.81 By establishing this cross cultural framework, SF operators are 
better prepared to address whatever culture they encounter in their area of responsibility 
(AOR).  
During the FC3 course, the Department of Regional Studies and Culture also 
touches on the human domain. As discussed earlier, “the human domain is comprised of 
humans, including humans as physical beings, human thought, emotion, human action, 
human collectives (such as groups), and what humans create.”82 The course examines 
“the various ways that the human domain has been defined and explained in the military 
context while specifically focusing on lieutenant general (LTG) Cleveland’s (USASOC 
                                                 
78 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. 
79 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. 
80 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. 
81 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 1. 
82 Gregg et al., The Human Domain, 4. 
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Commander) guidance on this emerging domain.”83 The Department of Regional Studies 
and Culture recognizes that “much of the SF mission relies on the ability of soldiers to 
interpret the human domain and work effectively with foreign national counterparts and 
local nationals while applying cross cultural field skills.”84 Much like the topic of culture, 
the human domain is very broad and complex. However, by introducing the human 
domain and the role of SF operators working within it, the FC3 course prepares SF 
trainees for not only what they will encounter during the remaining phases of the Q 
course, but for situations they may find themselves in later as an SF operator. The course 
syllabus is summarized in Table 1.85 
Table 1.   FC3 Syllabus  
CLASS SCHEDULE AND ASSIGNMENTS  
Operational Relevance  
Lesson Description:  
This lesson focuses on detailing the operational need for understanding culture and its 
components. This class will cover an introduction to FC3 with selected videos and 
readings to highlight the spectrum of cross cultural competency in a military 
environment. At the conclusion of this class, students will understand the range of 
“cultural competency” and how knowledge of culture or lack thereof, can effect SOF 
operations.  
Readings: 
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011. 
Defining Culture  
Lesson Description:  
This lesson focuses on foundational concepts of culture, which will be explored in the 
context of American society. Students are asked to take an introspective look at their own 
culture and examine their own values, beliefs and behaviors. This lesson will lay the 
ground work of self-awareness that is imperative to excelling in the challenging cross 
cultural settings SOF soldiers will be deployed.  
                                                 
83 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 5–6. 
84 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 8. 
85 USAJFKSWCS, SWEG(A), Department of Regional Studies and Culture, “Foundations of Cross 
Cultural Competence (FC3) Syllabus,” 3–9. 
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Readings:  
Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Culture (1973).  
 
Plous, S. (2003). The psychology of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination: An 
overview. In S. Plous (Ed.), Understanding Prejudice and Discrimination. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
 
Gehlback, H., Brinkworth, M.E., & Wang, M. (2012). The social perspective taking 
process: What motivates individuals to take another’s perspective? Teachers College 
Record. 
 
Dunne, Jonathan P. MAJ, USMC, “Maslow is Non-Deployable: Modifying Maslow’s 
Hierarchy for Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” in Applications in Operational Culture.  
 
Bargh, John A., “Our Unconscious Mind” in Scientific American, Volume 310, Number 
1, January 2014.  
The Complexity of Culture  
Lesson Description:  
In this lesson students will start to take a critical look at how they view others and how 
others view them. We will discuss concepts pertinent to the formation of our own culture, 
as well as the formation of our perceptions towards others, such as ethnocentrism, 
cultural relativism, stereotypes, biases and worldview.  
Readings: 
ARSOF 2022, Special Warfare, Vol. 26, Issue 2, April—June 2013. Greitens, Eric. 
“Kenya” Chapter 14, The Heart and the Fist: The Education of a Humanitarian, the 
Making of a Navy SEAL. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011.  
 
The Future of Special Operations, Linda Robinson, Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 2012.  
 
Human Domain Operations: Institutionalizing Eat Soup, Ruben Stewart, Small Wars 
Journal, 29 October 2013.  
 
Strategic Landpower Task Force, GEN James Amos, ADM William McRaven, and GEN 
Raymond Odierno, white paper, May 2013.  
 
Toward Strategic Landpower, LTG Charles T. Cleveland and LTC Stuart L. Farris, 
ARMY, July 20. 
 







“After ‘10 Years of Abject Failure,’ Army, SOCOM, Marine Leaders Focus on ‘Strategic 




McRaven: Success in Human Domain Fundamental to Special Ops, Claudette Roulo, 
American Forces Press Service, Defense.gov News Article, 5 June 2013. 
 
“U.S. Land Forces Highlight Their Importance Through ‘Human Domain’ Interaction,” 
Paul McLeary, Defense News, 14 May 2013, 
www.defensenews.com/article/20130514/DEFREG02/305140014/US-Land-Forces-
Highlight-Their-Importance-Through-Human-Domain-Interaction  
The Role of Culture in the Human Domain  
Lesson Description:  
This lesson focuses on the role of culture in the Human Domain. We will examine the 
various ways “Human Domain” has been defined and explained in the military context. 
We will specifically focus on LTG Cleveland’s guidance on this emerging domain.  
Readings:  
The Interpretation of Culture, Clifford Geertz. 
 




Taken by the Taliban: A Doctor’s Story of Captivity, Rescue, NPR. 
 
Readings: 
Cows, Pigs, Wars, and Witches; the Riddles of Culture, Marvin Harris, Prologue and 
Chapter 1 “Mother Cow.” 
 
The Interpretation of Culture, Clifford Geertz, Ch 5, “Ethos, Worldview, and the 
Analysis of Sacred Symbols,” 
Perspective Taking  
Lesson Description:  
In this class, students will learn to view situations through various “lenses,” taking into 
account cultural contexts. The class will center on discussion generated from viewing a 
portion of the documentary film “The Lost Boys of Sudan.” Student’s will be asked to 
identify various cultural concepts covered in previous lessons, as well as think critically 
about the values, behaviors and norms of the two main characters in the film and 
determine a strategy for how they would work with them.  
 
Readings:  
Ambady, N., LaPlante, D., Nguyen, T., Rosenthal, R., Chaumeton, N., & Levinson, W. 
(2002). Surgeons’ tone of voice: A clue to malpractice history. Surgery 
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Applying Anthropological Knowledge, Aaron Podolefsky, in Thinking 
Anthropologically: A Practical Guide for Students, third edition, Philip Carl Salzman 
and Patricia C. Rice. Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2011.  
 
Cross Cultural Communication  
Lesson Description: 
A successful cross cultural communicator can recognize differences in communication 
styles, detect understanding, and resolve misunderstanding. Upon completion of this 
section students will understand the complexities of interpersonal communication and 
how to apply interpersonal communication strategies when communicating with people 
outside of the student’s culture. 
 
Readings:  
What to Ask After Years of Denials, Juliet Macur, New York Times, 16 January, 2013. 
 
Applying Anthropological Knowledge, Aaron Podolefsky, in Thinking Anthropologically: 
A Practical Guide for Students, third edition, Philip Carl Salzman and Patricia C. Rice. 
Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2011. 
 
How journalists can work well with interpreters during interviews, Laura Shin. Poynter. 
13 November 2012, http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/newsgathering-
storytelling/194999/how-journalists-work-well-with-interpretors-when-reporting-stories/. 
 
Learning from Stories: Narrative Interviewing in Cross-Cultural Research, Cheryle 
Mattingly and Mary Lawlor, Department of Occupational Science & Occupational 
Therapy, Department of Anthropology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 
CA. National Institute of Health Public Access. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3051197/. 
 
The Interpretation of Culture, Clifford Geertz 
 
Applied Cross Cultural Field Skills  
Lesson Description:  
Much of the SOF mission relies on the ability of soldiers to interpret the human domain 
and work effectively with foreign nationals, counterparts and local nationals. This class 
will introduce applied skills and techniques for working with interpreters, interviewing 
and having purposeful conversations with locals. We will also introduce a framework for 
managing the iterative process of learning about and understanding the human terrain. 
Students will be given an opportunity to practice their conversation techniques while 
utilizing an interpreter during a practical exercise.  
Persuasion and Influence  
Lesson Description:  
This block of instruction explores techniques for persuasion, influence, and negotiation in 
cross cultural environments. The lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) require that Soldiers at all levels of command 
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participate as U.S. Military Representatives in meetings and negotiations with coalition 
partners, local leaders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other U.S. 
government agencies (OGAs). Understanding concepts, such as branding, priming and 
predictable dialogue, as well as listening and conversation techniques will enable the 
Solider to be more effective in their cross cultural interactions.  
FINAL EXERCISE  
Lesson Description:  
The final day of FC3 will be comprised of a final exercise and an after action review. 
Students will complete a practical exercise based on partial role playing scenario IOT 
demonstrate group and individual lessons learned from the preceding Culture classes. 
Given situation and objectives, each group will perform as either Insiders or Outsiders of 
a fictitious culture/community. Students will demonstrate (individually and in groups) the 
understanding of concepts and the proper utilization of skills needed in order to 




The FC3 course is admirable, as it takes a short but valuable 10 days of training to 
prepare SF students for some of the cultural interactions they may face during their real 
world operations. The addition of the FC3 course to the already crowded SF training 
pipeline signifies that the SF Regiment has recognized the importance of cultural 
understanding in its current and future missions, and has initiated training to better 
prepare SF operators to address culture.  
However, despite the promise of the FC3 course it does not, by design, prepare SF 
operators to be regional experts of a single culture in their respective area of 
responsibility. The FC3 course is merely a foundation for the understandings of culture 
and its significance in the human domain. By building this strong understanding of the 
impact culture can have on operations and the outcomes of operations, the FC3 course is 
preparing SF operators to be able to avoid cultural missteps, if not utilize culture to their 
advantage. Complemented with detailed pre-deployment training on area specific 
cultures, assuming there is time for this training, SF operators may be better prepared to 
operate in any area of the world.  
The final qualification requirement for SF operators in the Q course is a training 
event known as ROBIN SAGE, as described by USASOC in a press release:  
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ROBIN SAGE is the U.S. military’s premier unconventional warfare 
exercise and the final test of over a year’s worth of training for aspiring 
Special Forces Soldiers. Candidates are placed in an environment of 
political instability characterized by armed conflict, forcing Soldiers to 
analyze and solve problems to meet the challenges of this “real-world” 
training.86  
USASOC adds that during ROBING SAGE, SF trainees “must infiltrate areas in 
small groups and train guerilla forces to independently and effectively use tactical force 
to liberate the notional country of Pineland by teaching them to communicate, move, 
fight and provide medical aid.”87 To add to the realism of the event, “the exercise’s 
notional country of Pineland encompasses 15 counties in North Carolina. Throughout the 
exercise, SF trainees and ROBIN SAGE role-players not only conduct training missions, 
such as controlled assaults and key-leader engagements, but also live, eat and sleep in 
these civilian areas.”88 By incorporating entire communities into the exercise, ROBIN 
SAGE is able to replicate an immersion into another country and its culture.  
During ROBIN SAGE, SF trainees not only apply the skills they have learned 
during their time in the Q course, but they continue to refine their “rapport-building 
skills, how to organize clandestine guerrilla groups, and explore the strange nature of 
unconventional war.”89 SF officer Tony Schwalm continues: 
Green Berets get to know the people of other countries where we train 
(and fight) and do so intimately. Their goal is to ensure legitimacy and win 
rapport among people that our military is unaccustomed to worrying about 
very much. Success in pursuing U.S. interests anywhere in the world can 
be measured along these lines. When SF operators have legitimacy and 
rapport with the locals, the operators can walk freely without body armor 
among the people and rip the very heart out of the enemy’s ability to 
operate there. Legitimacy brings intimacy, and intimacy brings 
understanding and victory.90  
                                                 
86 “SOC: Robin Sage Exercise to Run Nov. 11–27,” accessed May 7, 2014, http://www.soc.mil/ 
UNS/Releases/2013/November/131105-02.html. 
87 “SOC: Robin Sage Exercise to Run Nov. 11–27.” 
88 “SOC: Robin Sage Exercise to Run Nov. 11–27.” 
89 Tony Schwalm, The Guerrilla Factory: The Making of Special Forces Officers, The Green Berets 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 2012), 57. 
90 Schwalm, The Guerrilla Factory, 7. 
35 
For SF trainees and future operators, ROBIN SAGE provides a final block of 
collective culture training prior to being assigned to an operational unit. Although the 
course is not designed to focus solely on culture, a cultural misstep during ROBIN SAGE 
can quickly be magnified and result in mission failure and a trainee not completing the Q 
course. Undoubtedly, ROBIN SAGE is an exceptional course that culminates over a 
year’s worth of tactical, language, and cultural training into one event. For most SF 
soldiers, however, ROBIN SAGE is the last exercise in which they test their cultural 
proficiency in a training scenario. As prescribed by the Army Training Network (ATN) 
and the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS), an ODA has up to 30 collective 
tasks in which it members must remain proficient.91 Some of these collective tasks, such 
as the situational training exercise for conducting a direct action mission, require 72 
hours of testing or practical exercise to demonstrate proficiency.92 Furthermore, to add to 
the complexity of training for a direct action mission, an ODA must be able to first 
successfully complete 11 less intensive collective tasks.93 In other words, a collective 
task as complex as conducting a direct action mission requires weeks of individual and 
collective training in addition to requiring sustainment training to remain proficient in 
that skill.  
USASOC Regulation 350–1 directs that each ODA and its operators be proficient 
in the following skills. 
Table 2.   ODA Required Skills 
ODA Advance Skill Requirements 
Skill 
Number Per ODA 
Jump Master  3 EA  
Free Fall Jump Master (MFF ODA)  3 EA  
Dive Supervisor (UWO ODA)  2 EA  
                                                 
91 “ATN,” accessed May 5, 2014, https://atn.army.mil/dsp_CATSreport.aspx?rptid=11501f11-1fb1-
47a4-af9a-3b3b06f29932. 
92 “ATN,” 71. 
93 “ATN,” 71. 
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ODA Advance Skill Requirements 
Skill 
Number Per ODA 
Dive Medical Tech (UWO ODA)  2 EA  
SF Sniper Course (Level I)  1 EA  
SF Sniper Course (Level II)  1 EA  
Advanced Special Ops (Level III)  2 EA  
Advanced Special Ops (Level II)  6 EA  
Special Technical Electronic Equipment 
(STEE)  
1 EA per SFG(A)  
SF Advanced Urban Combat  ALL  
Joint Tactical Air Controller  1 EA  
Joint Fires Observer  2 EA  
Small Unmanned Aircraft System 
Operator  
2 EA  
SOF Sensitive Site Exploitation 
(Operator Basic)  
ALL  
SOF Sensitive Site Exploitation 
(Operator Advance)  
2 EA  
Mountain (Level I) (MTN ODAs only)  2 EA  
Mountain (Level II) (MTN ODAs only)  4 EA  
Mountain (Level III) (MTN ODAs only)  6 EA  
Ammo/HAZMAT (Hazardous Material)  1 EA94 
 
These are the necessary skills required to be proficient and retain readiness for 
contingent missions that fall in the scope of the SF core mission set. From this 350–1 list, 
for example, advanced special ops LVL III requires 14 weeks of intensive training to 
                                                 
94 USASOC, USASFC(A)Regulation 350-1.20 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), 37–
41. 
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complete and the SF sniper course requires eight weeks to complete.95 In order to become 
compliant with the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) Regulation 
for just two of the required proficiencies, an ODA would lose three of their operators for 
a total of 36 weeks. After realizing the level of training required to ensure that SF 
operators remain proficient in their directed missions and common core skills, SF 
leadership is faced with the task of balancing training requirements with limited training 
time. 
Alongside these many requirements for training and proficiency within an SF 
ODA, culture and language training are also mandated. Multiple cultures and languages 
typically exist in a single SF Group’s area of responsibility, presenting considerable 
challenges in meeting the stated goal of language and cultural expertise. For example, a 
SF operator in 7th Special Forces Group, Airborne (SFG(A)), which has the geographic 
responsibility of Latin America, including the Caribbean, may be expected to be an 
expert in the countless cultures that make up the 32 countries in their area of 
responsibility.96 The Caribbean and Latin America have at least 129 different 
languages.97 Furthermore, the number of cultures is virtually unknown. Given the 
difficulty of defining culture and training for language and cultural proficiency in just this 
one AOR, the goal of SF operators being an expert in the language and culture of their 
AOR is resoundingly difficult.  
After identifying the directives laid out by the DOD, the U.S. Army, and 
USASOC, the commanders are faced with a daunting task of ensuring the preparedness 
of their units to conduct the operations with which they are tasked. Clearly, preparation 
for each mission is unique to the objective of that mission and the tasks required to be 
conducted to achieve that objective. However, some level of understanding of the 
cultures within the AOR would contribute to mission success; therefore, training for 
those cultures should be part of the mission preparation. The challenge becomes meeting 
                                                 
95 USAJFKSWCS, Academic Handbook: Academic Year 2013–2014 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, 2013), 40. 
96 “Center for Army Lessons Learned,” accessed May 5, 2014, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/ 
thesaurus/toc.asp?id=596. 
97 “AILLA,” accessed June 9, 2014, http://www.ailla.utexas.org/site/lg_about.html.  
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all of the requirements laid out for an SF ODA—including language and culture 
proficiency—given limited time and diversity in geographic regions and missions. 
Furthermore, in addition to meeting the basic requirements for language and 
culture proficiency, additional language and culture training for SF operators is not 
mandated after their completion of the qualification course; this training is expected to be 
conducted by individual operators in order to remain proficient in both fields. Language 
ratings of individual SF operators are required by USASFC to be updated annually. Yet 
without a measure of effectiveness or proficiency, or even a target culture to study, 
individual operators and their detachments are charged with being culturally proficient in 
whatever area of the world they may find themselves conducting operations.  
Without metrics to gauge cultural proficiency, or even a single established culture 
in which to remain proficient, operators are left trying to become familiar with cultural 
generalities from across their assigned AOR. Furthermore, mandatory training for their 
other assigned tasks forces operators to learn cultural generalities just prior to their 
deployment. In even worse scenarios, operators are forced to learn the culture of an area 
after they arrive, which could lead to cultural faux pas and a loss of rapport or even the 
support of a host nation counterpart.  
Chapter IV offers three case-study vignettes on historical examples, both positive 
and negative, of U.S. military operations where knowing the culture of the target groups 
was paramount for mission success. These case studies demonstrate both the successes 
and failures that come from the critical variable of cultural knowledge. 
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IV. THE OSS, MITT TEAMS AND MCDONALDS IN EAST ASIA: 
THREE CASE STUDIES OF CULTURE AND OPERATIONS 
This chapter considers three case studies where cultural awareness, or lack 
thereof, has had an effect on operations: the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 
World War II, in which U.S. operatives were dropped behind enemy lines in both the 
European and Pacific theaters with the goal of aiding local resistance, the creation of 
Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq and Afghanistan,98 with the aim of training 
local forces, and the development of McDonalds restaurants in East Asia. By looking at 
historical examples outside of SF of both military units operating overseas and 
international businesses, some important lessons remain applicable when preparing 
current and future SF operators to be culturally proficient.  
This chapter finds that both the OSS in World War II (WWII) and McDonald’s 
restaurants have enjoyed a considerable amount of success in their overseas operations. 
This success can be attributed to their heightened level of cultural awareness, their 
cultural flexibility, and their overall level cross of cultural competence. Conversely, the 
success of MiTT in Iraq and Afghanistan was limited, due to the lack of cultural 
proficiency possessed by the teams along with poor selection criteria and overall lack of 
time to train for the mission. Throughout the examination of all three cases, it is clear that 
no organization of outsiders can be completely culturally proficient in another’s culture. 
However, pre-exposure to a culture, a heighted level of cultural awareness, a willingness 
to incorporate local norms, and cross cultural competence are important to the level of 
success of that organization.  
A. OSS 
The OSS was particularly successful in organizing and directing partisan forces 
and conducting subversion and sabotage operations in WWII. Their high level of success 
                                                 
98 There have been several versions of Military Transition Teams responsible for training and advising 
Afghan and Iraqi forces during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including 
embedded training teams (ETTs) and others. In order to limit the use of acronyms, all training teams in this 
thesis will be referred to as MiTT.  
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is partially attributed to the cultural proficiency possessed by OSS operators. The OSS 
recognized that it was much more expedient to recruit an individual who already 
possessed cultural knowledge and language proficiency from the area of the world in 
which they would serve and train,99 rather than attempt to train a military member in a 
foreign language and culture from scratch. The U.S. Government took advantage of its 
nation of immigrants to build its culturally and linguistically proficient forces. Although 
the term “cross cultural competency” is relatively new, the principles of the definition are 
applicable to the OSS recruits and later to the OSS operatives. Jessica Ternley, of the 
Joint Special Operations University, defines cross cultural competency as, “the ability to 
quickly learn to operate efficiently in any culture, and culture-specific or regional 
knowledge that equips one to behave appropriately in a particular culture.”100 
Prior to joining the fight against the Axis Powers in WWII, the U.S. government 
was taking actions to standup a covert organization. Richard Smith, a historian of the 
OSS notes, “Five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated 
America’s entry into the World War, Franklin Roosevelt christened a mysterious addition 
to this new Deal alphabet bureaucracy, called the COI, and was headed by Bill 
Donovan.”101 Smith added that less than a year later, Donovan’s organization was 
renamed the OSS and was “given an ambiguous mandate to plan and operate such special 
services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.”102 OSS records 
show that the mission of the OSS was twofold. First, the OSS was to “set up research 
units and an elaborate network of agents to gather strategic information concerning the 
activities and vulnerabilities of the nation’s enemies, to analyze and evaluate this 
information, and to report it to those concerned.”103 Second, the OSS was to “conduct a 
multiplicity of destructive operations behind enemy lines, to aid and train resistance 
                                                 
99 JSOU and OSS Society Symposium, Irregular Warfare and the OSS Model (Hurlburt Field, FL: 
Joint Special Operations University, 2009), 14. 
100 Jessica Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF Are the Way SOF Are 
(Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2011), 2–3.  
101 Smith, OSS, 1. 
102 Smith, OSS, 2. 
103 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office Strategic 
Services (New York, NY: Rinehart and Company, 1958), 10. 
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groups, and, by radio, pamphlets, and other means, to disintegrate the morale of enemy 
troops and encourage the forces of the underground.”104  
Historian John Whiteclay Chambers II claims that in an effort to further organize 
a popular resistance, “the OSS engaged in new forms of warfare for the United States: 
centralized intelligence, “fifth column” activities [subversion from within an enemy’s 
territory], psychological or “political warfare,” and the kind of sabotage, commando raids 
and directed guerrilla activity now known as irregular warfare.”105 The OSS recognized 
that to gain greater access to the indigenous population, knowledge of the local language 
and culture would be critical. This recognition helped focus the OSS’ assessment and 
selection efforts.  
By recruiting from the most capable candidates from within the population, the 
OSS began to reflect the cultural diversity present in the United States. Smith notes that 
German reports regarding the makeup of the OSS noted, “altogether they represent a 
perfect picture of the mixture of races and characters in that savage conglomeration 
called the United States of America, and anyone who observes them can well judge the 
state of mind and instability that must be prevalent in their country today.”106 Smith adds 
that German reports also reflect their assessment of the OSS and its cultural diversity; 
“We can only congratulate ourselves that this group of enemy agents will give us no 
trouble.”107 In spite of German arrogance, the OSS and its diverse cadre of operatives 
was able to gain access to their target population across occupied European and Asian 
theaters.  
In particular, the United States capitalized on its immigrant population, who could 
draw from their experiences with the indigenous population and their cultures. In 
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addition, the OSS looked for people who could gain access and placement within the 
indigenous population. The OSS tapped veterans of the Spanish Civil War, cliques of 
anti-Bolshevik Russian émigrés, some of them descendants of the fallen nobility.108 The 
OSS employed former Polish Czarist Army officers, French born and educated American 
business executives, and other French-Americans who were experts in French culture, 
such as university professors who taught French.109 Smith points out that the OSS also 
recruited 
men and women from the ranks of socialist groups, such as the Jewish 
Agency Executive, the International Transport Workers Federation, and 
the International Federation of Trade Unions. In Asia, many officers had a 
missionary background and were instilled with a family tradition of 
evangelical support for social reform.110  
This mixture of recent male and female immigrants was able to interact with their own 
countrymen in ways that non-native speakers and culturists could not.111 Documents 
from the OSS assessment staff claim reflect this following assumption: 
Many foreigners and first-generation Americans were recruited because 
they were familiar with the language, people, and territory of their 
respective lands of origin. Farmers machine workers, salesmen, 
stockholders, explorers, chemists, diplomats, physicians, philosophers, 
congressmen, and theologians.112  
Chambers points out that to gain access to these diverse cultural groups with the United 
States  
OSS Personnel Procurement Branch scoured training camps and advanced 
schools of all services looking for intelligent candidates knowledgeable in 
a foreign language who were willing to volunteer for unspecified 
challenging and hazardous duty behind enemy lines.113  
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A look at OSS records of one group of recruits slated for Far East service, which 
consisted of ninety candidates, demonstrates the diversity of which the OSS tried to field. 
Twelve of the 90 recruits were from America and were of an eastern race or nationality. 
Only “thirty-seven of the recruits spoke English; the rest spoke a variety of other 
languages, including French, Chinese (11 different dialects), Thai, Japanese, and 
Arabic.”114 As reports from the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and the OSS 
Society Symposium put it, “The mission was to select foreign-language-speaking Army 
personnel and train them to operate as military units in enemy or enemy-held 
territories.”115  
Despite its reliance on émigrés with language and cultural skills, recruits to the 
OSS did receive both cultural and military training. However, the OSS looked to recruit 
the most culturally competent and language proficient candidates prior to training, in 
order to limit the amount of emphasis and time needed to ensure that recruit was 
culturally proficient. Notes from the JSOU and the OSS Society Symposium state that 
prospective personnel were selected based on language and cultural 
awareness for the area in which they would be operating. They later 
underwent a 6-week training period where they focused on small unit 
tactics, field craft, weapons, vehicle operations, espionage, and organizing 
and training guerrilla forces.116  
With such an abbreviated training period, the OSS cadre of recruiters focused on only 
select groups of candidates. “Recruits were to speak the language and know the culture of 
the region in which they would operate, to help gain the trust of the indigenous 
populations.”117 Recognizing that it may not be possible to create truly culturally 
proficient operatives in a limited time, focused recruiting enabled the OSS cadre to field a 
sufficient force.  
Although native language and cultural skills were sought out, candidates were not 
automatically qualified to be an OSS operative. As OSS records show, the OSS stressed 
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common sense over cultural knowledge: “We simply must have men [sic] who can 
shoulder responsibility and use initiative with common sense. Simply because a man has 
intelligence does not qualify him for this type of work.”118 The OSS candidates were 
trained in their respective jobs, such as propagandist; however, if they were not able to 
demonstrate cultural sensitivity, they were not considered a viable candidate. An OSS 
Assessment Staff document claims: “The assumption was that if a candidate was not 
sensitive to cultural differences, he would have little success as a propagandist no matter 
how great his writing skill, his proficiency in the graphic arts, or his administrative 
ability.”119 A lack of cross cultural competence was more important than the possession 
of certain technical skills.  
OSS candidates were tested in the field prior to deploying. For example, 
candidates for the pacific campaign were sent to Kandy, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) prior to 
deployment. An OSS assessment staff document claims the following: 
This part of the world, a land of many peoples of contrasting cultures, 
languages, and habits, and of attitudes strangely different from our own; a 
part of the world where each of the many racial, religious, and national 
groups understood little about the others, and distrusted or hated them 
from reasons that sometimes go back far into the past.120  
Following Ceylon, OSS candidates were moved to India and then on to several 
different areas in China.121 OSS assessment staff documents state, “With each 
transplantation [sic] came the problems of cultural differences and unfathomable 
motivations. With the changes in cultures and nationalities came the changes in 
languages and dialects.”122 Additionally, the overseas training, which immersed 
candidates in foreign cultures other than the ones they knew, forced the OSS agents to 
recognize that there were limitations to the degree that an outsider can gain access with 
an indigenous group. Chambers points out as OSS agents recognized their limitations, 
                                                 
118 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, 13. 
119 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, 122. 
120 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, 350. 
121 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, 350. 
122 The OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, 350. 
45 
“the number of OSS personnel overseas increased dramatically as they sought to train 
indigenous agents, the overseas detachments established their own training schools.”123 
Chambers added that while the training was fast paced and aggressive, “the best training, 
it was believed, gave already talented, independent individuals the skills, concepts and 
confidence to be adaptable leaders in an unpredictable environment.”124 
Tangible results were available almost immediately after the fielding of OSS 
operatives, specifically in improved intelligence and connections with resistance 
movements behind enemy lines. Historian Richard Smith claims, “Within weeks, 
Murphy’s amateur spies were flooding Washington with valuable reports on all 
significant military and political developments in the colonies.”125 Through the cultural 
similarities shared with the local population, including culture and language, OSS 
operatives quickly built rapport and networks to support their operations.126 Throughout 
the war, this shared interdependence continued to produce results. Chambers claims, “By 
the end of the war, the OSS’s program of selection, evaluation, and training, and equally 
if not more important its successes overseas showed the importance of obtaining the right 
individuals and giving them the skills, equipment, and confidence to do the job.”127 
The OSS training pipeline was fast-paced and aggressive, yet it was condensed 
when compared to the training pipeline that modern SF operators undergo today. The 
need for less training can be attributed to the fact that the OSS specifically recruited 
individuals with skill sets appropriate for the jobs that they would conduct, specifically 
language and cultural skills. While the OSS focused their recruiting efforts on personnel 
that possessed a high degree of cultural and language proficiency, they also realized that 
there were limitations on the access an outsider can gain with an indigenous group. In 
these cases, the possession of certain technical skills was more important than language 
or cultural proficiency.  
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B. MITT 
Military Transition Teams were created to build and train security forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The first MiTTs were deployed in Iraq in mid-2004.128 During the 
course of both wars, MiTTs contributed significantly to the coalition effort of training an 
estimated 600,000 indigenous troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.129 Despite these impressive 
numbers, their overall success is questionable, particularly in light of the recent invasion 
of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant advances into Iraq and the crumbling of Iraqi security 
forces virtually overnight.130 Furthermore, after action reports (AARs) and lessons 
learned from the employment of MiTTs indicate that, in many cases, the teams were 
woefully underprepared and inadequately trained to conduct their assigned advisor 
missions. Many of these AAR comments suggest that MiTTs were not trained to 
understand the cultural nuances they would face during their deployments.  
Strategies in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars called for the DOD to conduct 
Security Force Assistance (SFA) as a means of building indigenous security forces that 
could fight their own insurgencies and help stabilize their countries, allowing U.S. forces 
to withdrawal. Marine Officer Joseph Jones points out that 
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 2005 articulates the plan to 
develop the Armed forces of Iraq in order to provide security for the 
country. Along the “Security Track” the document states that “the training, 
equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an Army 
and police force capable of independently providing security and 
maintaining public order in Iraq.131  
More specifically, Fox and Stowell describe the MiTT mission as follows:  
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After rapidly defeating the militaries and national command structures of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. was faced with the complex task of 
rebuilding no only the military forces, but also police and border security 
forces in both countries. Services quickly formed, trained, and deployed 
teams of advisors-initially and primarily comprised of reserve forces 
personnel. These Military Training teams (MiTTs) were trained at 
multiple locations, by multiple trainers, with different results in the quality 
of training.132  
Additionally, other problems with the MiTTs surfaced. Fox and Stowell claim, 
“Additional advisor teams were formed “out of hide” from units already deployed.”133 
Fox and Stowell suggest, “Internal MiTTs were assigned a wide variety of people who 
received no training on their role as an advisor. Some units recognize the importance of 
the mission and send skilled people, while others see this as just another tasker and fill it 
with any available Soldier.”134 When units did not recognize the value or importance of 
the MiTT mission, they were likely to send their “least valuable” or least skilled soldiers 
to fill the vacant MiTT positions. By not manning the MiTTs with capable soldiers, these 
internal MiTTs were faced with increasingly difficult odds from their inception.  
MiTTs across the services were plagued with similar problems of training and 
manning deficiencies. A Marine MiTT commander noted that, “This concept assumes 
that military transition teams are capable of executing the tasks of the transition mission” 
and that “the USMC MiTTs as organized, trained, educated is inadequate to meet current 
and future operational requirements as required in the National Strategy.”135 Another 
MiTT commander observed that MiTTs were manned by whomever was available and 
were “thrown together from across the Army, many Transition Teams contained men 
who lacked the training, aptitude, and discipline to serve in these autonomous roles.”136 
David Voorhies claims, “Most (augmentees) were lower enlisted and lacked the 
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necessary experience and training to adequately advise their Iraqi counterparts.”137 
Compounding the issues presented by the organizational design of the MiTTs, the 
selection of their personnel, and the lack of sufficient training was the lack of cross 
cultural competence of the MiTTs prior to their deployment.  
MiTTs were organized similarly to a SF Operational Detachment Alpha 
(SFODA), with 12 soldiers working in the fields of operations, administration, logistics, 
signal, and medical.138 One MiTT commander explained that his “principal duties 
entailed leading an 11-man transition team to advise and train an Iraqi Infantry Battalion 
Commander and maintain tactical over-watch of a 750-man Iraqi Army Battalion in 
combat.” The commander added: 
I am not a Special Forces officer. I don’t speak Arabic. My cultural 
understanding of the Middle East was restricted to cultural briefings by the 
Army and what I read in professional journals and books. At the time, I 
had not even deployed to fight the Global war on Terror.139  
The commander lamented that after being assigned the task of MiTT commander, “in my 
heart, I believe that I was woefully unqualified to assume this important mission.”140 
The pre-deployment training for MiTTs undoubtedly improved throughout the 
course of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. However, many times MiTTs were deployed 
without the amount of training required to serve as advisors to foreign troops. A MiTT 
commander remarked on his MiTT specific training prior to deployment, “The training I 
received as a MiTT advisor was abysmal. We were treated like mobilized National 
Guardsmen, and very little of the training dealt with training Iraqis specifically. Most of it 
was mandatory pre-deployment training and force protection [tactics, techniques, and 
procedures] TTPs.”141 Regarding the training received by MiTTs, a Marine MiTT 
commander noted, “As a quantitative measure of all courses, 95 percent of training time, 
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is allotted to combat skills internal to the advisor team; however, combat skills about 
organization survival don’t necessarily translate to mission accomplishment.”142  
Based on feedback from MiTT AARs, changes in pre-deployment training 
occurred throughout the course of both wars. However, the implementation of quality and 
sufficient pre-deployment training was not timely and was not resourced properly. Fox 
and Stowell claim, “While the improvement in advisor training rested on the high caliber 
of its leaders and Soldiers, they were not properly resourced at the institutional level.”143 
AAR comments indicate that “the Army’s current 60-day advisor training course is too 
short—especially considering the fact that many Soldiers selected as advisors need re-
training on basic military skills, such as weapons qualification and first aid.”144 For 
example, during the pre-deployment training of MiTTs from the Multi-National Security 
Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTCI), the training plan directed training focused on the 
core tasks of shoot, move, and communicate. Of the 54 sub-tasks associated with those, 
only three were focused on the culture or language of their Iraqi counterparts.145 
Weapons qualification, vehicle operations, technical communication, medical training 
and other combat focused tasks were clearly the priority in the case of this MiTT pre-
deployment training. Additionally, as Fox and Stowell point out, “Subjects, such as cross 
cultural communications, language training, and foreign military structure and functions 
are not trained or are inadequately covered.”146 Table 3 displays a breakdown of the 
required training for MNSTCI MiTTs prior to their deployments to Iraq.147  
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Table 3.   MiTT Training Plan 
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Reports from MiTT reviews held comments like, “Advisor training deficiencies 
were soon apparent,”148 “Not every Soldier is capable of being a good advisor,”149 and 
“Major deficiencies remain in the current ad hoc method of shaping advisor operations—
not just in training but in the entire “advisor program” as a whole.”150 Unfortunately, 
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these opinions, which were shaped by MiTT performance, were not isolated. As the 
training for MiTTs was still being developed and refined, many of the finer points of 
being a foreign advisor were not acquired until the MiTT advisors were well into their 
deployments with their Iraqi or Afghan counterparts. A MiTT commander noted that his 
pre-deployment training was not all that was needed during his time on a MiTT:  
Being politically correct and culturally sensitive is great if you’re merely 
visiting an Arab country for a short period of time on a diplomatic visit, 
but if you want to train them and advise them in combat you have to get 
them to do things they ordinarily would not do. To understand them to the 
point of being able to influence them to motivate action, you must know 
how they think, know what motivates them, and know how they react to 
both danger and incentive.151  
The MiTT commander added that one of his most important lessons learned after 
deploying was to “Know their History, Get Rapport…but Be Yourself.”152  
The level of success achieved by MiTTs may have been greater if increased 
emphasis had been placed on both the selection and training of the personnel that made 
up those teams. Conducting SFA and advising foreign troops are both challenging 
missions in themselves. Sending both unqualified and undertrained soldiers to conduct 
those missions only increases the difficulty of achieving success in those missions. Many 
of these AAR comments suggest that MiTTs were not trained to understand the culture 
and the cultural nuisances they would face during their deployments. Illustrations of the 
pitfalls of MiTT selection, training, and utilization may serve the SF regiments as 
examples to avoid when preparing SF operators to be culturally proficient.  
C. MCDONALD’S IN EAST ASIA 
After viewing the success of a small restaurant started by the McDonald bothers, 
Ray Kroc acquired the rights to the McDonald’s name and launched his company 
nationwide in 1955. Within three years, McDonald’s had sold 100 million hamburgers.153 
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The McDonald’s website claims, “Ray Kroc wanted to build a restaurant system that 
would be famous for food of consistently high quality and uniform methods of 
preparation. He wanted to serve burgers, buns, fries and beverages that tasted just the 
same in Alaska as they did in Alabama.”154 The McDonald’s franchise has been 
astronomically successful both in the United States and abroad. Today, according to 
James Watson, author of Golden Arches East, “McDonald’s operates in more than 100 
countries.”155 The willingness to seek out what is culturally acceptable in each country, 
combined with the western appeal of McDonald’s, and a common theme throughout their 
restaurants has been a blueprint for success in their overseas franchises.  
McDonald’s success overseas, however, was not guaranteed. In fact, countless 
American enterprises fail overseas. Overseas business analyst Nicole Knicker claims, 
“Many franchises that market their products on a worldwide scale can either fail 
miserably to succeed in attracting their audiences overseas. One company that is doing it 
right is McDonald’s.”156 Knicker goes on to assert, “They are a franchise that has 
succeeded in incorporating Global Marketing Strategies by taking advantage of the 
cultural differences each country has, by incorporating these cultural differences 
tastefully into their marketing strategies.”157 In addition to catering to local cultures, 
McDonald’s has ensured that the unique Americanism of the franchise was not lost. 
Panos Mourdoukoutas, author of McDonald’s Winning Strategy, argues, “McDonald’s 
rode the globalization trend by transferring the American way of life to many countries 
around the world. At the same time, it adapted to the social context of each country by 
franchising of local entrepreneurs.”158 A look at the specifics of how McDonald’s has 
been successful overseas may be beneficial if applied to SF operations and working with 
foreign cultures in the human domain.  
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While McDonald’s has been successful in incorporating local culture into its 
brand, not all communities are eager to adopt McDonald’s and its Western flavor. 
Watson explains that 
Chinese leaders appear to be aligning themselves with European and 
American intellectuals who have long equated McDonald’s and its rivals 
in the fast food industry as agents of cultural imperialism—a new form of 
exploitation that results from the export of popular culture from the United 
States, Japan, and Europe to other parts of the world.159 
Despite occasional pushback from Asian traditionalists, McDonald’s has worked to 
embed itself into the local culture. Watson describes it as such: 
Corporations that are capable of manipulating personal “tastes” will thrive 
as state authorities lose control over the distribution and consumption of 
goods and services. Popular culture, in this view, generates a vision, a 
fantasy, of the good life, and if the Big Mac, Coke, and Disney cartoons 
are perceived as an integral part of that life, American companies cannot 
lose.160  
The success of McDonald’s around the globe suggests that they have incorporated local 
cultures into its practices and menu items. However, some still insist that as McDonald’s 
does this, they are in reality forcing the local culture to become more American. Watson 
argues 
we (the U.S.) purvey a culture based on mass entertainment and mass 
gratification… the cultural message we transmit through Hollywood and 
McDonald’s goes out across the world to capture, and also to undermine, 
other societies…. Unlike more traditional conquerors, we are not content 
merely to subdue others: We insist that they be like us.161 
The success of McDonald’s is in its international business approach; specifically, 
adaptability and flexibility have allowed it to flourish in overseas markets while, at the 
same time, its brand has remained constant. ABC News reported that, “the average 
McDonald’s brings in $2.6 million in sales annually.”162 Watson goes on to say, “The 
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Golden Arches have become an icon of international business and popular culture, 
recognized nearly everywhere on the planet, the very name, its “Mc” prefix, and the 
ubiquitous Golden Arches are recognized and imitated throughout the world.”163  
In order to ensure the standardization and quality of McDonald’s franchises, the 
company has its own formal education system. The McDonald’s website explains that, 
“In 1961, Ray [Kroc] launched a training program, later called Hamburger University. 
There, franchisees and operators were trained in the scientific methods of running a 
successful McDonald’s. Today, more than 80,000 people have graduated from the 
program.”164 ABC News notes, “the facility has 19 full-time professors who teach 
different courses aimed at how to run a McDonald’s restaurant for managers, mid-
managers, and executives in 28 different languages.”165 The creation of Hamburger 
University, which is a true global training center for its franchisees and employees from 
around the world, ensures that there is a common theme among all McDonald’s 
franchises.  
McDonald’s goes to great lengths to ensure that franchisees are properly trained 
to uphold the core values of the McDonald’s brand. Moneymax101.com states, 
“McDonald’s requires that franchisees spend nine unpaid months (attending Hamburger 
University or shadowing other established franchises) learning all aspects of the 
McDonald’s corporate culture.”166 These steps display the lengths that the corporation 
goes in order to train and indoctrinate franchisees in the McDonald’s core values and to 
ensure that those values remain present wherever that franchise is located. 
Furthermore, McDonald’s has created a product that is symbolic; it is more than 
just American food. This point is echoed by Watson:  
The Golden Arches have always represented something other than food. 
McDonald’s symbolizes different things to different people at different 
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times in their lives: Predictability, safety, convenience, fun, familiarity, 
sanctuary, cleanliness, modernity, culinary tourism, and “connectedness” 
to the world beyond.167  
By carrying these values or norms with their franchise, across different cultures, 
McDonald’s can adopt local customs while remaining standardized across cultures. 
Watson further states, “The key to McDonald’s worldwide success is that people 
everywhere know what to expect when they pass through the Golden Arches.”168  
McDonald’s represents something different to all of its customers. However, there 
is a common theme at all McDonald’s. White notes, “The familiarity factor is central to 
McDonald’s success; McDonald’s stands for home, familiarity, and friendship.”169 This 
type of standardization helps the McDonald’s brand remain popular across different 
countries and different cultures. While standardized, the McDonald’s brand is flexible 
enough to change depending on the culture in which it is operating.  
James Cantalupo, president of McDonald’s International, claims that his goals for 
McDonald’s is to “become as much a part of the local culture as possible.” He objects 
when “people call us a multinational. I like to call us multilocal.”170 What McDonald’s 
refers to simply as its localization strategy, can be applied across different international 
business models or applied to SF and their overseas operations. Watson claims, 
“McDonald’s localization strategy revolves around the ability to discern, and respond to 
consumer needs.”171 This localization strategy allows the franchise owner, many times a 
local to the area, to determine what is culturally acceptable in that location and provides 
that franchise owner the leverage to modify his local standard, while keeping with the 
McDonald’s brand and core values.  
One example of McDonald’s adaptability to other cultures is in its menu. 
Specifically, McDonald’s adjusts their menu to dietary restrictions, consults with local 
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religious leaders, and plays directly to local values. Knicker claims, “McDonald’s creates 
menu options that satisfy the pallets of those countries that may not like all American 
cuisine selections. These new options give those international markets the ability to enjoy 
McDonald’s while staying true to their cultural customs.”172 For example, Watson points 
out, to make their menu socially acceptable in Malaysia and Singapore, “McDonald’s 
underwent rigorous inspections by Muslim clerics to ensure ritual cleanliness; the chain 
was rewarded with a halal (religiously clean) certificate, indicating the total absence of 
pork products.”173 Additionally, Knicker notes that “McDonald’s advertisements in 
Malaysia try to feature the importance of family values and how McDonald’s can bring 
them closer to each other” playing to the importance of family in Malaysian culture.174 
Knicker also describes, “In India, a country where eating beef is frowned upon, they have 
created the “Pizza McPuff” and the “McVeggie.” It is choices like this that make their 
international markets feel as though McDonald’s is trying to serve the country’s cultural 
differences.”175 McDonald’s continually seeks what is socially acceptable in each 
franchise location and works to incorporate those norms into its own brand.  
As a result of the flexibility of McDonald’s, the franchise has seamlessly 
immersed itself into the local culture. Watson claims 
it is no longer possible to distinguish between what is “local” and what is 
“foreign.” Who is to say that Mickey Mouse is not Japanese, or that 
Ronald McDonald is not Chinese? To millions of children who watch 
Chinese television, “Uncle McDonald” (alias Ronald) is probably more 
familiar than the mythical characters of Chinese folklore.176  
Watson notes that by making the necessary cultural changes and by adopting the local 
norms, “McDonald’s convinced its customers that transnational is local.”177 The locals 
have grown to accept the McDonald’s culture as part of their own, without sacrificing 
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their values to the west. For example, Watson claims, “The people of Hong Kong have 
embraced American-style fast foods. But, they have not been stripped of their cultural 
traditions; they have not become “Americanized” in any but the most superficial 
ways.”178 By keeping what is important to each local culture present throughout the 
atmosphere that each restaurant conveys, McDonald’s is able to engrain itself into the 
fabric of the local culture. Watson adds, “McDonald’s has become a routine, 
unremarkable feature of the urban landscape in Japan and Hong Kong. It is so “local” that 
many younger customers do not know of the company’s foreign origins.”179 Essentially, 
McDonald’s incorporates so many of the key aspects of the culture present around each 
franchise location, that McDonald’s is able to become a part of the local culture itself.  
McDonald’s success overseas can be attributed to several aspects of their business 
model, many of which can be applied by SF while operating overseas. Perhaps the most 
important factor is what McDonald’s refers to as its localization strategy. Watson asserts, 
“McDonald’s localization strategy revolves around the ability to discern, and respond to 
consumer needs.”180 McDonald’s recognizes that each culture has its own sensibilities to 
which it must cater. By infusing what is local into the McDonald’s brand, the franchise is 
viewed, at least in part, as local and increases buy in from the populace to the point that 
the outsider is no longer an outsider, but considered local. McDonald’s does this while 
retaining a standardized set of values and customer service, which adds to both its 
consistency and familiarity wherever it is located. These standards and core set of values 
is further maintained by rigorous education and training, ensuring that the local 
McDonald’s management is versed in the policies and procedures of the corporation. 
This indoctrination is achieved either through extensive training at Hamburger University 
or during the mandatory shadowing of an established franchise. This delicate balance of 
local and U.S. norms and values is a model that could provide important clues for SF 
cultural training for partnering with foreign countries, and will be elaborated on in the 
concluding chapter.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
The three case studies presented in this chapter offer a range of strategies for 
creating teams aimed at operating overseas and training team members for cross cultural 
engagements. The OSS focused their recruiting efforts on segments of the population 
who already possessed a high degree of foreign language proficiency and cultural 
knowledge of the area in which they would operate. The OSS recognized that by 
recruiting persons who already possessed these attributes, it could focus on training the 
recruits in military aspects of their job as operatives. In other words, the OSS recognized 
that it is much easier to train a culture expert to become a soldier, than it is to train a 
soldier to be a culture expert.  
In contrast, the hardships faced by MiTT personnel and the critiques of their 
performance while deployed are examples of the importance of selecting the right 
personnel and providing adequate cultural training prior to their deployment. In addition 
to selecting the right people for the job, it is equally important that they receive the 
necessary training. AARs and personal testimonies reveal that MiTTs were not provided 
with adequate cultural and language training to be effective advisors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The ad hoc standup of the MiTTs, the selection of the personnel, the lack of 
emphasis placed on adequate training for their mission, and the speed in which they were 
fielded all had a combined effect on the lack of success in their mission. As combat and 
tactical training took precedence in the MiTTs pre-deployment preparations, culture and 
language training did not receive the emphasis that it required. Many times these MiTTs 
were underprepared for the cultural engagements that awaited them after they arrived in 
theater, due to the abbreviated or inferior cultural training they had received.  
The success of McDonald’s overseas is attributed to their ability to identify and 
cater to the cultural nuances, which are important to the locals, and resulted in the 
assimilation of McDonald’s into the local culture. Moreover, McDonald’s achieved this 
while maintaining a standardized set of norms and values throughout their franchises.  
A heightened level of cultural awareness, cultural flexibility, and cross cultural 
competence all contributed to the success of the OSS in WWII and the McDonald’s 
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restaurant franchise overseas. To the contrary, MiTTs were hampered by their lack of 
cultural proficiency while operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. As demonstrated by these 
three cases, no outside organization can be completely culturally proficient in another’s 
culture. The final chapter will take these lessons learned from these cases and apply them 
to SF, considering the role that new selection and training techniques could play in 
making SF soldiers more culturally astute and mission effective. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Culture is a very tough concept to grasp; becoming an expert on any culture may 
prove an equally difficult task. Despite this, understanding and leveraging culture is a 
stated goal of U.S. Special Forces and identified as critical to mission success. This thesis 
has aimed to better understand culture for SF by, first, providing a basic overview of the 
academic debates surrounding culture, and offer a working definition for the U.S. Special 
Forces Regiment. Second, this thesis investigated three cases outside of SF: the creation 
of culturally proficient teams in the OSS in World War II, the ad hoc construction MiTTs 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and their efforts to train indigenous forces, and the McDonald’s 
franchise’s efforts to open restaurants around the world by remaining American yet 
becoming “local.”  
As presented in Chapter II, how culture is defined and how it is understood varies 
widely across academic disciplines. For example, some scholars shy away from culture 
and refuse to define it, while others refer to culture simply as a concept. The business 
world takes slightly less of a conceptual view of culture and focuses more on the role of 
culture in economics, negotiations, or in transnational business relations. The U.S. 
military and its component commands have varying definitions of culture as well. This 
lack of consensus in defining culture, its purpose, and how to study it presents 
considerable challenges for USASOC and its requirement to make SF culturally 
proficient. However, the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual offers a definition of 
culture while, not perfect, is useful, and describes it as 
an “operational code” that is valid for an entire group of people; this 
observation corresponds to academic literature that describes culture as a 
motivating force. In other words, culture conditions the individual’s range 
of actions and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do 
it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with.181 
Furthermore, it is important to identify not only what culture is, but also what it 
does. Ultimately, culture is a code that affects behavior. As described in chapter II, 
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cultural codes, specifically social capital, is particularly useful for training SF operators 
to identify values and norms of a culture and how they govern behavior. Social capital 
can be compared to rapport, or in other instances social capital could equate to trust. By 
identifying and catering to the informal values and norms of a group, SF operators may 
be able to build rapport and credibility with that group, and ultimately affect their 
behavior. Training SF operators to identify values and norms of a culture in order to gain 
social capital could prove more effective than attempting to train an operator to be an 
expert of the specifics of a given culture.  
Second, this thesis used case studies to better understand successes and failures of 
cultural engagements outside of SF in the hopes of gaining new and useful insights for 
leveraging culture as a warfighting capability. By looking at historical case studies of 
other organizations operating overseas, many times in a “by, with, and through” capacity, 
the SF regiment may be able to use some of the best practices and avoid some of the 
pitfalls of those organizations.  
The OSS in WWII, MiTTs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
McDonald’s franchises operation overseas all provide important lessons in dealing with 
foreign cultures. Some of the success of the OSS may be attributed to their focused 
recruiting and practice of selecting personnel who already possessed firsthand knowledge 
of the culture and language of their targeted area of operation. The OSS took advantage 
of the United States’ vast recruiting pool of recent immigrants to build a culturally and 
linguistically proficient force. The OSS also recognized that it was much easier to train a 
culture and language expert to be a soldier than it was to train a soldier to be an expert in 
culture and language. By recruiting from specific ethnic groups, both from within the 
military and from the general population, the OSS was able to ensure that their operatives 
were culturally proficient.  
MiTTs faced considerable challenges from their inception. Most MiTTs were 
rushed into operation by their higher headquarters, were inadequately equipped, and 
sometimes manned with personnel who were not suited to serve as military advisors. 
Exacerbating the difficulties of being improperly manned, MiTTs were given inadequate 
training in their target cultures. Moreover, many of the soldiers selected to serve on 
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MiTTs demonstrated little comprehension of the combat skills required to serve as an 
advisor. Training, therefore, focused primarily on basic combat skills and pushed cultural 
training aside. The speed in which MiTTs were fielded, their lack of attention to the 
Soldiers and Marines chosen for the mission, and the scant training in cultural nuances all 
led to a questionable record of success in training indigenous security forces.  
A look at the practices of an international business, such as McDonald’s, offers a 
fresh perspective on how to approach overseas operations in a culture centric 
environment. While McDonald’s franchises are never faced with the same stresses that an 
SF operator might confront on the battlefield, businesses are continually challenged with 
the prospect of financial failure. The success of McDonald’s overseas demonstrates that 
the ability to identify and adjust and cater to cultural nuances, which are important to the 
locals, results in McDonalds’ incorporation into the local culture itself. Moreover, 
McDonald’s achieved success while maintaining a standardized set of norms and values 
throughout their franchises, making it extremely successful as a global fast food chain.  
Furthermore, McDonald’s training program, through both Hamburger University 
and its system of “shadowing” managers through a mentoring program, successfully 
indoctrinates franchises with the core values of the corporation. At the same time, 
McDonald’s localization strategy allows franchises to blend local customs with the 
western appeal of the McDonald’s brand. In other words, McDonald’s franchises 
overseas are known for adopting local norms while keeping the core values of 
McDonald’s.  
A. APPLYING THESE LESSONS TO SF 
The case studies investigated in this thesis offer valuable lessons for SF. First, SF 
operators can learn from the mistakes of the MiTTs by adhering to the SOF truths. 
Although MiTTs were not SOF, they were modeled like an SFODA and were given a 
mission, which is commonly assigned to SOF. However, contrary to the SOF truths, 
MiTTs were mass produced. Additionally, SF operators must remain cognizant of the fact 
that combat advisory skills require advisors to be competent in combat skills while 
working across the cultural divides that differentiate them from their counterparts. 
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Focusing primarily on the combat tasks associated with an operation and not the cultural 
aspects may decrease the effectiveness of SF operators when serving as advisors to 
foreign troops. Pre-deployment training, therefore, must balance training in combat skills 
with education in cultural skills in order to ensure that SF operators are able to be 
effective across cultural lines.  
Lessons from the OSS also can serve as examples of success for SF operators 
while working with their foreign counterparts. As the OSS demonstrated, selection of 
culturally prequalified personnel can limit the training time required to produce an 
effective operative. By focusing SF recruiting on the civilian population, specifically on 
minority and immigrant groups, SF can add culture and language experts to the ranks of 
the regiment. However, this approach may be limited. For example, 7th Group Special 
Forces has managed to leverage the substantial number of Latinos in the Army to create 
teams that often include native speakers or those familiar with specific Latino cultures. 
However, other ethnic groups may be more difficult to recruit. For example, Arab 
speakers and those that have firsthand knowledge of Arab culture are few in the U.S. 
military and in high demand. Additionally, the OSS demonstrated that selecting an 
individual who possessed initiative, common sense, and cultural sensitivity was more 
important than selecting an individual with a certain technical skill. The OSS recognized 
that it was much easier to train a culture and language expert to be a soldier than it was to 
train a soldier to be an expert in culture and language. The SF regiment may be well 
served to recognize the same, although this approach does have limitations. 
Many lessons can be learned from the McDonald’s corporation regarding their 
techniques and procedures when training for operating overseas. For example, SF leaders 
and planners should recognize that SF operators need the latitude to create their own 
localization strategy, similar to the approach of McDonald’s franchises. In other words, 
just as McDonald’s franchisees are able to identify marketing strategies that will be 
successful locally, SF operators should be able to identify what lines of operation will be 
successful in the areas they are operating. Also similar to the McDonald’s approach, as 
long as the SF operators remain true to the “core values” of the mission, a team’s ability 
to localize their approach should be encouraged by their higher command.  
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Although not easily duplicated, the techniques and procedures utilized by the OSS 
and McDonald’s for successful operations in a foreign culture could be applied by the SF 
regiment and can contribute to creating a more culturally proficient operator. 
Furthermore, with the importance of cultural proficiency on the outcome of operations, 
these techniques and procedures can help create more effective SF operators overall.  
Additionally, SF faces limitations in becoming more culturally proficient. First, 
there is no established way to measure cultural proficiency in SF. Given the ambiguity of 
the subject of culture and the countless number of cultures present in a single region of 
the world, creating a test to measure cultural proficiency may not be feasible. However, 
other methods to ensure SF operators are culturally proficient should be implemented. 
For example, other possible methods include ensuring that operators are cross-culturally 
competent by certifying that they are well informed about the religious, political, and 
geographical history of their Group’s entire area of operation. While being informed 
about their AO will not guarantee that operators are culturally proficient, knowledge 
shared between an indigenous culture and an SF operator can lead to rapport and better 
communications between the two cultures.  
Another possible method to ensure cultural proficiency is to assign SF ODAs a 
specific “micro-region” within their Group’s AOR to maintain an ongoing and in-depth 
study of the cultures, populations, terrain, security forces, and power structures contained 
within that micro-region. Ideally, each ODA should be able to conduct all of their Theater 
Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) 
deployments within that micro-region, further building the cultural proficiency of that 
ODA. While each micro-region may contain multiple complex cultures within it, the 
ability to become familiar with and even proficient in those cultures is greater than 
compared to the group’s entire AOR.  
Second, the current doctrine surrounding culture combined with the additional 
required training tasks leave SF leadership little open space on their training schedule. 
Lack of training time makes it increasingly difficult for SF operators to satisfy the 
requirements placed on them by their higher commands. As demonstrated in Chapter III, 
SF operators and ODAs are required to possess and maintain proficiency in an extensive 
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list of skills. Moreover, after identifying the directives laid out by the DOD, the U.S. 
Army, and USASOC, SF commanders are faced with the daunting task of ensuring that 
their units are prepared to conduct the operations with which they are tasked. Clearly, 
preparation for each mission is unique to the objective of that mission and the tasks 
required in achieving that objective. Despite the challenges associated with meeting 
training requirements, educating SF soldiers in culture should be part of the mission 
preparation.  
To help mitigate the difficulty of balancing cultural training and mission specific 
training, SF leaders should normalize both culture and language training among the 
operational units, similar to physical fitness training (PT). Physical fitness is one of the 
core tenets of being a soldier. Cultural proficiency must be viewed similarly since many 
SF missions require the operator to be cross culturally competent. Just as with PT, daily 
cultural training should be conducted to ensure operators are remaining proficient. By 
consistently and continually conducting cultural training, SF leadership will be better 
prepared to focus their remaining training time on mission specific tasks prior to 
deployment.  
Lastly, in addition to meeting the basic requirements for language and culture 
proficiency, additional language and culture training for SF operators is not mandated 
after completion of the qualification course; this training is expected to be conducted by 
individual operators in order to remain proficient in both fields. USASFC requires 
language ratings of individual SF operators to be updated annually. However, language 
proficiency does not equate to cultural proficiency and language training should not be 
used in lieu of cultural training. In addition, without a measure of effectiveness for 
proficiency or even a target culture to study, individual operators and their detachments 
are charged with being culturally proficient in whatever area of the world they find 
themselves conducting operations.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To remedy these issues, top-down emphasis must be placed on cultural 
proficiency. Due to the profound variety among cultures in an area and the difficulty of 
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measuring proficiency in a single culture, USASFC should assign SF operators a region 
of the world that coincides with their foreign language. Current regional alignment of SF 
Groups has been displaced by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; now that major combat 
operations have ended in both areas, the SF Regiment should get back to its roots and 
regionally align. Moreover, SF operators within those groups have a number of languages 
that may not be commonly found within the Group’s AORs. For example, SF operators 
assigned to 5th Special Forces Group may be assigned Russian or French languages, 
which may not be commonly used in many of the Arab nations found in the Group’s 
AOR. Alongside returning to regional alignment, bi-annual, self-study training can be 
managed by USASFC, where the operator will complete online training and education to 
ensure a common base of knowledge is shared among operators who are assigned that 
region of the world. While this top down emphasis from USASFC will not create cultural 
experts, it will ensure that SF operators remain familiar with a specific region and the 
cultures that exist within that region. Ideally, this training would better prepare operators 
to work with the indigenous population of an area. While not an expert in the cultures of 
the area, the SF operator may be more prepared to deal with the indigenous cultures and 
able to build social capital with the locals by having a greater understanding of what to do 
and not do, how to do or not do it, and with whom to do it or not to do it.182 
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